🩸 WHEN THE GOVERNMENT BECOMES THE SMUGGLER
Who Profits When a Nation’s Fuel Disappears?
Red Blood Journal | Investigations & Special Reports
November 16, 2026
An Investigation into Iran’s Fuel Economy, Institutional Accountability, and the Human Cost of Organized Smuggling
EDITORIAL NOTE
This investigation examines documented fuel-smuggling problems in Iran alongside allegations made by investigative journalist Yashar Soltani in a Persian-language interview. Some allegations concern specific government institutions and alleged misconduct that has not been independently established.
Red Blood Journal distinguishes verified information from attributed claims, calculations, and editorial interpretation. The purpose is not to declare anyone guilty without evidence, but to identify the records and financial transactions that could establish responsibility.
For viewers watching a video adaptation: This video is only an overview of the investigation. The complete written report, including evidence, sources, important qualifications, and unanswered questions, is linked in the description. Readers are encouraged to examine that evidence and reach their own conclusions.
I. THE NATION THAT LOSES ITS FUEL
Imagine living in a country so rich in petroleum resources that fuel can be sold domestically for a fraction of its international value. Now imagine that the same country struggles with fuel shortages, inflation, public debt, and the consequences of a deteriorating economy.
Each year, enormous quantities of subsidized petroleum products are allegedly diverted from legitimate domestic uses. The government searches for money, ordinary citizens face restrictions, and border communities become dependent on transporting fuel as a means of survival.
The natural question is who steals the fuel. But that question may begin too late in the transaction.
Before fuel can be smuggled, it must be produced or imported, allocated, transported, stored, and distributed. Every one of those stages can involve official documentation, financial authorization, and institutional oversight.
If a substantial quantity disappears, the investigation cannot end with the driver who carries it across the border.
It must begin with the system that supplied it.
II. THE NUMBERS: HOW MUCH FUEL IS MISSING?
In December 2024, President Masoud Pezeshkian reportedly described fuel smuggling of approximately 20–30 million liters per day as a serious national problem.
In May 2025, Alireza Rashidian, head of Iran’s anti-smuggling headquarters, cited approximately 20 million liters daily and estimated annual losses at roughly $4 billion. He also acknowledged the diversion of fuel allocated to power plants and agricultural activities.
In November 2026, reports attributed the figure of 30 million liters per day to Executive Vice President Mohammad Jafar Ghaempanah.
The interview examined here uses the higher estimate of 30 million liters and claims an annual financial value of approximately $8 billion.
These estimates require careful interpretation. Thirty million liters daily equals 10.95 billion liters annually, but an estimate of smuggled volume is not the same thing as a measurement of physically verified losses.
Nor are government replacement costs, foregone export revenue, public subsidy costs, and criminal profits necessarily interchangeable.
To establish the real financial damage, investigators need reliable records showing how much fuel was allocated, delivered, consumed, exported legally, or diverted.
Until those records are reconciled, the numbers describe a potential national problem rather than an audited financial statement.
III. THE PROFIT THAT MAKES SMUGGLING ATTRACTIVE
Iran’s fuel subsidy system creates a major difference between what consumers pay domestically and what similar products can command elsewhere.
The interview describes subsidized diesel priced at approximately 300 tomans per liter and asserts a government cost of 170,000 tomans per liter.
That extraordinary cost estimate is not established by the interview. Other published estimates of diesel production costs differ substantially, so the precise subsidy cannot responsibly be calculated from that figure alone.
Nevertheless, the fundamental economic incentive is clear: when a controlled product can be acquired cheaply in one market and sold for much more in another, diversion becomes financially attractive.
A low-paid transporter might carry a few hundred liters to survive. An organized network with access to documentation, fuel allocations, tankers, storage facilities, and customers can potentially move far greater quantities.
The important distinction is between the person carrying the fuel and the person controlling its source.
The greatest profits may not necessarily go to the most visible participants.
IV. THE RAZZAQ PROGRAM: WHEN SURVIVAL BECOMES POLICY
One of the interview’s central accusations concerns the Razzaq program in Sistan and Baluchestan.
This is not an entirely imaginary program. Independent research has documented official schemes authorizing certain border residents to purchase and resell allocated fuel as part of regulated cross-border trading arrangements.
The International Crisis Group described how such programs emerged in a region affected by unemployment, water scarcity, weak economic opportunities, and longstanding underdevelopment.
The interview alleges that approximately 100,000 households were connected to the Razzaq system through 60 tribal leaders, involving roughly 4,000 pickup trucks and as much as 10 million liters of fuel per day.
Those exact participation and volume figures remain unverified.
What independent research does support is the existence of fuel allocation programs, their relationship to poverty, and the possibility that politically connected intermediaries capture benefits intended for ordinary residents.
There is also an important legal distinction: officially authorized cross-border trading is not automatically the same as criminal smuggling.
Yet even when an arrangement is authorized, a question remains.
Why should a government with access to enormous national resources make transporting subsidized fuel a primary development strategy for its poorest communities?
If legitimate employment, education, infrastructure, and industrial investment remain inadequate, fuel trading becomes a mechanism of dependence rather than durable economic development.
The government has not necessarily solved poverty. It may have reorganized poverty around the fuel distribution system.
V. THE GOVERNMENT AS BUYER: AN ALLEGATION REQUIRING RECORDS
The interview describes a second arrangement, characterized as a government-organized fuel purchasing program.
According to the speaker, approximately 70 purchasing locations were established in Sistan and Baluchestan, handling as much as four million liters of fuel per day.
He alleges that fuel collected from different parts of Iran was purchased through these arrangements and subsequently moved toward neighboring countries.
This is an exceptionally serious accusation because it implies that an official institution could act as an intermediary between diverted domestic fuel and cross-border markets.
But the existence, legal status, ownership, operating instructions, and actual volumes of the alleged purchasing stations have not been independently verified for this report.
The records needed are identifiable: purchasing contracts, payment beneficiaries, fuel receipts, authorizing regulations, inspection records, and transfer documentation.
A government may legally purchase or administer fuel under a regulated program. Establishing criminal complicity would require evidence that officials knowingly purchased illegally diverted fuel, falsified transactions, or facilitated unauthorized transfers.
This is where an investigation should follow transactions, not simply repeat accusations.
VI. THE PAPERWORK THAT COULD MAKE FUEL DISAPPEAR
The most consequential part of the interview may concern transportation documents rather than border crossings.
The speaker alleges that approximately seven billion liters annually are diverted through transportation-related allocations, including fictitious freight records, and that another three billion liters are associated with discrepancies in the energy sector.
These exact quantities have not been verified.
However, the underlying vulnerability is not merely hypothetical.
Iranian anti-smuggling officials have acknowledged irregularities in fuel delivered to agricultural and power-generation activities. Official reporting in 2025 described approximately 69,000 irregularities detected in a review of around 200,000 fuel shipments.
Independent energy analysis has also identified transport fuel allocations and inaccurate end-user information as important vulnerabilities.
Consider a simplified example.
A transportation operator receives a fuel allocation based on an authorized journey. If the journey does not occur, or if the recorded journey is exaggerated, the allocation can potentially be separated from the activity that justified it.
The fuel may then enter an unauthorized resale network.
This illustration is not proof of any particular transaction. It demonstrates why an investigation must connect fuel records to actual vehicle movements and verified deliveries.
When the paperwork is false, the destination of the fuel becomes difficult to establish.
VII. THE MINISTRIES AND THE ALLEGED 626-MILLION-LITER DISCREPANCY
Another allegation involves the reported difference between fuel allocated by the Ministry of Petroleum and fuel recorded as received by the Ministry of Agriculture.
The interview gives a figure of approximately 626 million liters.
If such a discrepancy exists within comparable accounting periods and product categories, it would warrant a substantial investigation.
But missing quantities in separate administrative reports do not automatically prove theft.
Differences could reflect reporting periods, product classifications, accounting treatment, incomplete deliveries, or diversion. The original records would be necessary to distinguish among them.
A credible investigation would establish the exact reporting dates, compare the authorized and delivered quantities, reconcile inventory changes, and identify the responsible custodians.
Only then could it determine whether the apparent discrepancy represents a reporting problem, an allocation failure, or criminal misconduct.
VIII. THE SMUGGLING ROUTES: WHO CONTROLS THE EXIT?
The interview claims there are eight principal fuel-smuggling routes, six involving government oversight or control and two operating primarily through maritime networks.
It further describes alleged unauthorized pipeline connections, fuel storage near airport infrastructure in Hormozgan, marine fuel bladders, and transfers to vessels offshore.
These are leads requiring investigation, not independently demonstrated findings about the alleged sites.
Nevertheless, organized maritime trafficking and major fuel-smuggling networks have been the subject of official investigations.
In 2025, judicial authorities in Hormozgan reported an investigation into 35 interconnected networks allegedly responsible for moving billions of liters over several years. The judicial accusations themselves must still be distinguished from final findings of guilt.
The existence of large networks raises a difficult operational question.
How can unauthorized fuel move in substantial quantities through regulated transport and storage infrastructure?
Possible explanations include forged records, weak oversight, corrupt individuals, inadequate monitoring, legitimate allocations diverted downstream, and the exploitation of gaps among agencies.
None of these possibilities, by itself, establishes that the entire government coordinates smuggling.
But the number of potential control points makes institutional accountability unavoidable.
IX. THE PRICE OF LOOKING AWAY
At approximately 23 minutes into the interview, the speaker introduces the Persian term OK-giri.
He describes alleged payments made to obtain noninterference from enforcement or supervisory personnel.
He claims one maritime operation involved payments of approximately 700 million tomans per night.
The allegation has not been independently corroborated for this report, and no verified payment ledger or identified recipient was supplied.
Nevertheless, it introduces one of the most important questions in investigating organized smuggling.
If payments are made to prevent inspections, the money trail can potentially identify both the business operators and the officials involved.
An investigation should seek financial records, witness corroboration, customs and enforcement activity logs, and evidence connecting a specific payment to a specific failure to act.
Bribery must be demonstrated through evidence, not inferred solely from the fact that smuggling occurs.
X. FOLLOW THE MONEY — BUT COUNT IT CORRECTLY
The uploaded interview describes a business worth approximately $8 billion annually.
It also uses the expression two million billion tomans, which means two quadrillion tomans, or approximately 2,000 trillion tomans.
That is materially different from two trillion tomans.
Using the interview’s asserted figures:
30 million liters per day × 365 days = 10.95 billion liters annually.
10.95 billion liters × 170,000 tomans per liter = approximately 1.86 quadrillion tomans.
This explains the approximate large toman figure, but it does not validate the claimed government cost or the suggested $8 billion valuation.
More fundamentally, the cost of fuel is not the same as criminal revenue, and criminal revenue is not the same as net profit.
The investigation must separate four financial questions:
What is the government’s actual economic loss?
What do the organizers receive from fuel sales?
What portion goes to transporters, intermediaries, and distributors?
Is any portion demonstrably received by corrupt officials or politically connected beneficiaries?
These questions matter because an enormous market value does not prove that a single organization receives all the money.
XI. SANCTIONS, OIL REVENUE, AND TWO DIFFERENT SMUGGLING SYSTEMS
Iran also operates in an environment shaped by international petroleum sanctions.
United States financial authorities have described networks using intermediaries, front companies, shipping arrangements, and concealed financial transactions to move Iranian oil into international markets.
However, sanctioned crude-oil exports and the illegal diversion of subsidized domestic diesel are not automatically the same activity.
The first may involve attempts to evade international sanctions on petroleum trade. The second concerns domestic allocation systems, subsidized products, unauthorized resale, and losses to Iranian households or the public treasury.
Both can create opportunities for secrecy, opaque transactions, and intermediaries, but evidence of one does not establish operational control of the other.
The larger investigative question is whether financial secrecy, sanctions restrictions, and domestic subsidy abuse create overlapping opportunities for the same intermediaries.
That possibility deserves examination without presuming that every network has the same owners or beneficiaries.
XII. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DEPENDENCE
The interview presents a broader argument: that the fuel-trading system has become so economically embedded that reform threatens the livelihoods of ordinary residents and the interests of more powerful participants.
This is plausible as an institutional problem.
A subsidy can begin as protection for consumers. An allocation can become a marketable privilege. Intermediaries can acquire influence over access to that privilege.
Over time, some beneficiaries may resist reforms even when those reforms could improve the national economy.
But there are two different kinds of resistance.
Poor families may resist because reform threatens their immediate survival. Powerful intermediaries may resist because reform threatens profits or influence.
Treating those groups as though they have identical interests would hide the unequal distribution of power.
A credible reform must therefore address both corruption and the legitimate economic needs of border communities.
Otherwise, eliminating a fuel program without replacing livelihoods could punish the least powerful participants while leaving major organizers untouched.
XIII. THE PEOPLE WHO PAY TWICE
The central human tragedy is that ordinary citizens can suffer from fuel diversion in more than one way.
They may face shortages, higher public expenses, pressure for subsidy reforms, and fewer resources available for infrastructure and economic development.
At the same time, people living in impoverished border regions may depend on hazardous fuel transportation for their income.
International Crisis Group reporting describes the dangers faced by fuel porters, including road accidents and shootings involving border security forces.
The visible transporter may face the greatest immediate physical risk while having little influence over pricing, allocation, or the final market.
If public resources are diverted through corrupt arrangements, citizens effectively lose twice: once through the missing value of the resource and again through the failure to invest that value in their future.
The exact economic effects must be measured rather than assumed, but the question of who bears the cost remains essential.
XIV. WHEN REFORM THREATENS THE BENEFICIARIES
The interview alleges that local authorities have resisted particular proposals to redirect fuel revenue toward legitimate government sales and public benefits.
Those allegations require the original proposals, meeting records, and official responses before responsibility can be established.
Still, an important principle applies.
When an economic arrangement creates concentrated benefits and widely distributed costs, the beneficiaries may possess stronger incentives to defend the arrangement than ordinary citizens have to organize against it.
This does not require a hidden central command.
It can result from separate institutions, private operators, intermediaries, and corrupt individuals pursuing their own interests within the same defective system.
Institutional failure can become self-reinforcing even without a single person directing every transaction.
The test of reform is therefore not merely whether new rules are announced.
It is whether verified losses fall, unauthorized beneficiaries lose access, legitimate livelihoods improve, and public records become more transparent.
XV. WHAT WOULD PROVE THE CASE?
For a finding of organized government complicity, investigators would need more than extraordinary numbers and eyewitness accounts.
The most important evidence would include refinery and storage balances, fuel-allocation authorizations, electronic freight records, verified transportation movements, payment records, port and customs documentation, and the legal authority governing border fuel programs.
These records should answer whether fuel was allocated legitimately, delivered as represented, consumed for its intended purpose, diverted without authorization, and sold for personal gain.
Where public officials are implicated, there must be evidence of knowledge, authorization, financial benefit, or deliberate interference with enforcement.
Independent audits should also distinguish criminal diversion from administrative discrepancies and lawful cross-border commerce.
The strongest investigation is one whose conclusions remain open to correction by the records.
XVI. 🩸 RED BLOOD PERSPECTIVE
The question is not whether Iran has smugglers. It plainly does.
The question is what happens when a government’s own allocation and monitoring systems contain opportunities for large-scale diversion, while ordinary citizens are asked to absorb the consequences.
If people are expected to account for every liter of subsidized fuel they receive, public institutions should be capable of accounting for the millions of liters they allocate.
If an ordinary driver can be questioned over a missing fuel card, responsible authorities should be able to explain a major discrepancy in national distribution records.
If impoverished families are condemned for transporting fuel, the investigation should also examine who supplied the product, who authorized its allocation, who controlled the transportation records, and who collected the proceeds.
The purpose of accountability is not to replace one unproven accusation with another.
It is to make the chain of responsibility visible.
A government cannot build public trust through enforcement against the weakest participants while leaving the largest transactions unexplained.
The central Red Blood question is therefore not simply who carried the fuel across the border. It is who controlled the fuel before it reached the border, who benefited from its movement, and why the public cannot follow the transaction from beginning to end.
XVII. 🌊❤️✨ OCEAN OF LOVE AND POSITIVITY
Behind every statistic is a human life.
Behind the fuel porter is a family that needs food, a child who deserves an education, and a community that should not have to depend on dangerous work to survive.
Behind the public financial losses are schools that need support, hospitals that need equipment, communities that need clean water, and young people who deserve opportunities.
The answer is not to condemn an entire population or assume that every official is corrupt. Nor is it to excuse wrongdoing because the economy has made it profitable.
The answer begins by recognizing the equal dignity of the people who bear the consequences.
Justice means protecting innocent people, investigating credible evidence, recovering stolen public resources when wrongdoing is established, and building lawful opportunities that do not depend on exploitation.
A nation’s natural wealth should improve the lives of its people.
It should not become a reason for its people to fear one another, fight over scarcity, or lose hope in their future.
And perhaps the most important lesson extends beyond Iran.
We should not become so accustomed to institutional failure that we stop demanding evidence, fairness, and responsibility.
Real change begins when we refuse to confuse authority with accountability and remember that a government exists to serve human beings.
🩸🌊❤️✨ — Ocean of Love and Positivity.
XVIII. SOURCES AND RESEARCH NOTES
1. Primary source — Persian interview, November 2026.
“قاچاق روزانه ۳۰ میلیون لیتر سوخت؛ ردپای حاکمیت در تجارت ۲ تریلیون تومانی!” Uploaded transcript. Source for the allegations involving the Razzaq plan, government purchasing stations, ministry discrepancies, maritime routes, and alleged protection payments. These details are attributed to the speaker, not independently verified.
2. International Crisis Group — August 19, 2025.
Grievance and Flawed Governance in Iran’s Baluchestan. Independent analysis of border fuel economies, government allocation programs, corruption risks, livelihood dependence, and the dangers faced by fuel porters.
https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2130896/250-baluchestan.pdf
3. Iran’s anti-smuggling headquarters — May 26, 2025.
Public statements by Alireza Rashidian concerning daily fuel smuggling, estimated national losses, fuel diversion, and irregularities in shipments. Reported by Press TV.
https://www.presstv.co.uk/Detail/2025/05/26/748709/Iran-fuel-smuggling-losses-estimate-official
4. Iran International — August 29, 2026.
Iran’s Missing Fuel: Can Border Smuggling Explain It All? Analysis of uncertainties in official fuel-loss estimates, transport allocations, distribution records, and the need for proper accounting.
https://www.iranintl.com/en/202608288051
5. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty — May 15, 2026.
Iran Is Smuggling Millions Of Liters Of Fuel To Pakistan Every Day. Reporting on cross-border fuel trade and its economic significance.
https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-pakistan-smuggling-fuel/33757626.html
6. U.S. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network — June 6, 2025.
Advisory on Iranian Oil Smuggling Networks. Evidence and risk indicators concerning sanctions-related petroleum trade and financial intermediaries. This concerns a related but distinct system from domestic subsidized-fuel diversion.
https://www.fincen.gov/system/files/advisory/2025-06-06/FinCEN-Advisory-Illicit-Oil-Smuggling-508.pdf
7. Iran International — November 14, 2026.
Seven Years After ‘Bloody November,’ Iran Rations Gasoline It Dares Not Reprice. Recent reporting on fuel restrictions and the 30-million-liter smuggling estimate.
https://cdn.iranintl.com/en/202611146434
EDITORIAL TRANSPARENCY
The documented evidence establishes a serious fuel-smuggling problem, the existence of government-administered border fuel programs, and officially acknowledged vulnerabilities in domestic allocations.
It does not independently establish all the interview’s numerical claims, the alleged purchasing-station scheme, named officials’ personal involvement, or a coordinated government-wide criminal operation.
The report’s central thesis is an accountability argument: the institutions that authorize, distribute, and monitor subsidized fuel should be investigated alongside those who physically transport stolen or illegally diverted products.
Evidence status: Research-supported investigative analysis with substantial allegations remaining open for verification.
Publication guidance: Preserve attribution and uncertainty language, especially in the headline, allegations of official involvement, financial estimates, and descriptions of specific institutions.
CLOSING VIDEO REMINDER
This video has presented an overview, not every piece of evidence or every qualification. Read the complete Red Blood Journal investigation using the link in the description, examine the sources, and form your own conclusions.
🩸🌊❤️✨ — Ocean of Love and Positivity.
⛽
When the Government Becomes the Smuggler
Nov 16, 2026
This investigative report examines Iran’s massive fuel-smuggling crisis, focusing on how millions of liters of heavily subsidized petroleum products are allegedly diverted daily through fraudulent transport paperwork, administrative discrepancies, and government-administered border programs. While officials acknowledge billions of dollars in annual losses and widespread distribution irregularities, unverified allegations suggest that high-ranking institutions and politically connected intermediaries may be facilitating these illicit networks. Consequently, the analysis argues that true institutional accountability requires tracing fuel transactions from their initial allocation sources rather than merely penalizing impoverished border communities and low-level drivers who survive by transporting the resource. Ultimately, the text emphasizes that ordinary citizens bear the heaviest human and economic toll through inflation, public debt, and dangerous labor, underscoring the urgent need for transparent audits and verified evidence.


