🩸 THE MYSTERY OF MOHSEN REZAEI
An Interview Examining Alleged Intelligence Networks, the 1979 Revolution, and Iran’s Political Future
Red Blood Journal | Interview Report | November 18, 2026
Source: Day 40 Analysis — The Mystery of Mohsen Rezaei
Original language: Persian (Farsi)
Format: Interview featuring host Afshin and guest Kourosh
Duration: Approximately 46 minutes
About This Report
This Red Blood Journal report presents the arguments, recollections, allegations, and political interpretations expressed in the Persian-language interview Day 40 Analysis — The Mystery of Mohsen Rezaei.
The interview offers an alternative interpretation of the origins of the Islamic Republic, the involvement of American intelligence agencies in Iranian affairs, and the political career of former Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps commander Mohsen Rezaei.
The interviewees connect events spanning more than four decades, from the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the Iran–Iraq War to the Iran-Contra affair, internal Iranian power struggles, and possible future changes in Iran’s political leadership.
This report does not independently verify or endorse the interviewees’ allegations. Its purpose is to present their perspective faithfully, without introducing Red Blood Journal’s own interpretation or drawing conclusions on their behalf.
The original transcript contains several incomplete or unclear passages. The report preserves the identifiable arguments without attempting to reconstruct missing statements.
I. The Central Argument: Who Really Controls the Islamic Republic?
The interview opens with a question about international power and the relationship between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Kourosh argues that understanding current developments requires returning to the Iranian Revolution of 1979. In his interpretation, the revolution was not simply a domestic uprising that replaced the monarchy with a religious government. Instead, he describes it as a political transformation facilitated by American intelligence and supported by several Western governments.
He explicitly states that he considers the Islamic Republic a government installed through American involvement, despite its public anti-American rhetoric.
According to Kourosh, the contradiction between the Islamic Republic’s hostility toward America and the alleged cooperation between its officials and American intelligence is central to understanding Iranian politics.
He argues that American intelligence networks maintained relationships with certain individuals who later occupied influential positions in the Islamic Republic.
Among those individuals, the interview identifies Mohsen Rezaei as a particularly important figure.
II. Mohsen Rezaei and the SAVAK Connection
Kourosh begins his account of Rezaei by discussing his arrest by SAVAK, the Shah-era Iranian intelligence and security organization.
He claims that Rezaei received intelligence and counterintelligence training through SAVAK rather than traveling abroad for guerrilla training like some other revolutionary figures.
In the guest’s interpretation, Rezaei’s detention and subsequent political development formed part of a larger intelligence operation.
Kourosh argues that Rezaei’s later public appearances, unusual statements, and reputation for political incompetence should not be mistaken for evidence that he lacked intelligence or strategic capability.
He maintains that Rezaei was carefully trained, prepared, and positioned for future assignments.
The interview further claims that Rezaei was part of the security arrangements surrounding Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s return to Iran in 1979.
Kourosh presents this early responsibility as evidence that Rezaei had already become a trusted participant in the political transition.
The guest also discusses Rezaei’s appearance in early televised political debates, suggesting that these appearances helped establish him as an important public figure.
III. The Mansourun Group and Alleged CIA Involvement
The interview then turns to the Mansourun organization, a revolutionary group associated with several individuals who later became prominent figures in the Islamic Republic’s security establishment.
Kourosh alleges that American intelligence helped organize several existing groups into a coordinated structure.
He describes this process as bringing together individuals responsible for different activities, including intelligence, security, guerrilla operations, and organizational coordination.
Among the individuals discussed are:
Mohsen Rezaei
Ahmad Vahidi
Ali Shamkhani
Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr
The guest argues that the continuing influence of figures associated with Mansourun reflects the survival of an older intelligence and political network.
He also discusses their later involvement in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and national security institutions.
In his interpretation, these relationships help explain why certain individuals have remained influential despite changes in political leadership.
Kourosh specifically alleges that Mohsen Rezaei maintained connections with the CIA and that this relationship explains his political survival.
IV. The Establishment of Revolutionary Guard Intelligence
A major portion of the interview concerns Rezaei’s rise within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
Kourosh presents Rezaei as an important participant in establishing the Revolutionary Guards’ intelligence and security apparatus.
He points to Rezaei’s appointment as commander of the IRGC at a relatively young age and his long tenure in that position.
According to the guest, repeated efforts to remove Rezaei failed because he possessed political protection and influence beyond his apparent institutional responsibilities.
Kourosh argues that influential people inside the Islamic Republic understood Rezaei’s special position and the authority associated with it.
He describes this position as part of a wider network whose operations were not necessarily visible through formal government appointments.
The interview presents Rezaei’s career not merely as a succession of military and political positions, but as the continuation of a long-term intelligence relationship.
V. The Iran–Iraq War: A Conflict Allegedly Designed to Continue
The interview’s discussion moves to the Iran–Iraq War, which lasted from 1980 to 1988.
Kourosh challenges the interpretation that certain Iranian military failures resulted primarily from incompetence.
He specifically discusses Operation Karbala-4, which suffered severe losses, and argues that the decisions associated with the operation were not simply mistakes.
Instead, he alleges that some decisions were deliberate and served an objective of prolonging the conflict.
The guest’s larger argument is that the war was intended to become a prolonged war of attrition.
He claims that such a conflict would weaken both Iran and Iraq, diminish the surviving strength of Iran’s pre-revolutionary military establishment, and produce major changes in the regional balance of power.
He also discusses Rezaei’s role in the events preceding the end of the war.
According to the interview, Rezaei’s letter outlining military requirements was passed to Khomeini through Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani.
The guest connects this letter to Khomeini’s eventual acceptance of the ceasefire, commonly associated with his reference to drinking a poisoned chalice.
Kourosh interprets both the continuation of the war and the circumstances surrounding its end as decisions connected to intelligence influence.
He specifically alleges that Rezaei was acting under instructions originating from American intelligence.
VI. SAVAK, American Intelligence, and the Fall of the Shah
Afshin questions how the guest’s allegations about SAVAK can be reconciled with the organization’s responsibility to protect the Shah’s government.
Kourosh responds by distinguishing between the formal mission of SAVAK and what he believes certain elements within the organization were actually doing.
He argues that because SAVAK was established with American assistance, American intelligence possessed detailed knowledge of its personnel and capabilities.
The guest alleges that some members of SAVAK were recruited or influenced to support activities that ultimately undermined the monarchy.
He describes situations in which security authorities allegedly knew about revolutionary organizing but did not intervene decisively.
According to his interpretation, explanations such as monitoring suspects to identify larger networks may sometimes have concealed deliberate assistance.
He further alleges that support for revolutionary activities included help involving travel documents and passports.
Kourosh expands this argument beyond American intelligence, stating that the governments of France and Britain also played roles in creating the conditions for the Shah’s removal.
He presents the revolution as a coordinated political development rather than an event that emerged suddenly.
VII. The McFarlane Affair and the Supply of Weapons to Iran
One of the interview’s central historical references is the McFarlane affair, associated with the Iran-Contra scandal and American arms transfers to Iran during the Iran–Iraq War.
Kourosh identifies Mohsen Rezaei as a key intermediary in the relationship between American intelligence and the Islamic Republic.
He alleges that Rezaei communicated directly with American intelligence personnel concerning Iran’s military requirements.
In his account, American and Israeli weapons helped Iran prevent Iraqi forces from achieving a decisive victory.
The guest interprets these transfers as part of a broader strategy to prevent either side from winning quickly.
He argues that the continuation of the conflict weakened both countries while allowing external powers to influence the outcome.
Kourosh repeatedly returns to the question of why governments publicly hostile to the Islamic Republic would provide it with military equipment.
For him, the alleged role of Rezaei in these transactions is an important part of the explanation.
VIII. Alleged Meetings With CIA Officers in Europe
The interview includes a specific allegation concerning meetings between Rezaei and American intelligence personnel after his service as IRGC commander.
Kourosh claims that Rezaei met CIA representatives on two occasions:
2002: Frankfurt, Germany.
2003: Athens, Greece, possibly in June.
The guest refers to an American intelligence officer whose name is indistinct in the original transcription.
He alleges that information was exchanged during these meetings and that senior figures in the Islamic Republic were aware of Rezaei’s contacts.
These alleged meetings are presented as further support for the guest’s argument that Rezaei maintained an ongoing relationship with American intelligence.
The interview does not provide the underlying meeting records or documentary evidence necessary to independently establish these allegations.
IX. Ahmad Rezaei: Defection, Political Interviews, and Death
The discussion turns to Ahmad Rezaei, Mohsen Rezaei’s son.
Kourosh describes Ahmad’s departure from Iran, his activities in the United States, and his public opposition to the Islamic Republic.
The interview includes archival excerpts in which Ahmad discusses his political views, Iranian history, and his reasons for opposing the political system established after 1979.
In those excerpts, Ahmad argues that Iran needed political reform rather than revolution during the Shah’s reign.
He contrasts that period with the Islamic Republic, stating that contemporary Iran requires a more fundamental political transformation.
Ahmad also describes difficulties involving the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
According to the interview excerpt, he believed influential individuals in the United States had created misleading information that caused the FBI to suspect him of acting as an Iranian government agent.
Kourosh then discusses Ahmad’s death in a Dubai hotel.
He alleges that Ahmad was caught in an intelligence operation and deliberately killed.
The guest rejects suggestions that Mohsen Rezaei personally killed his own son, instead proposing that the incident may have been connected to competing intelligence and political interests.
The interview presents this death as part of the broader struggle surrounding Rezaei’s position.
X. A Journalist’s Account of Threats Following an Interview
The program also includes an archival interview with a journalist who discusses interviewing Ahmad Rezaei.
The journalist describes the subsequent killing of his father in Shiraz.
He says he later learned that his younger brother had allegedly received warnings intended to prevent the interview from taking place.
According to the journalist’s account, the threats were not initially communicated to him.
He describes the killing of his father as a traumatic event and challenges the suggestion that the death resulted from an ordinary robbery.
The archival interviewer refers to information suggesting that the killing had been described as politically motivated.
Within the larger program, this testimony is presented as another example of the danger allegedly surrounding individuals who became involved in sensitive intelligence and political matters.
The testimony is a separate account presented within the interview and does not, by itself, establish who was responsible for the killing or its connection to Ahmad Rezaei.
XI. Internal Power Struggles and Khamenei’s Relationship With Rezaei
Kourosh argues that Mohsen Rezaei’s political career cannot be understood without considering conflicts inside the Islamic Republic.
He describes repeated efforts by Rezaei to obtain elected political office and suggests that Ali Khamenei limited his rise.
The guest points to Rezaei’s unsuccessful electoral campaigns and public humiliation as examples of this conflict.
He interprets these events as evidence of competition between different political and intelligence networks operating within the same governing structure.
According to his account, some factions were associated with American interests, while others maintained relationships with Russian, British, or European centers of influence.
Kourosh argues that these competing interests have shaped the Islamic Republic’s internal power struggles for decades.
He believes Rezaei’s survival demonstrates the continued influence of the network with which he associates him.
XII. Mehdi Hashemi, Montazeri, and the Iran-Contra Disclosure
The interview also examines political struggles involving Ayatollah Hossein-Ali Montazeri and Seyyed Mehdi Hashemi.
Kourosh discusses Hashemi’s role in the Revolutionary Guards’ early organization in Isfahan and the political network surrounding Montazeri.
He identifies Hashemi as the individual who disclosed information about the American arms dealings associated with the McFarlane affair to a Lebanese newspaper.
According to the guest, this disclosure affected internal political competition and contributed to Hashemi’s eventual downfall.
Kourosh also alleges that Hashemi had previously been connected to intelligence networks, despite later becoming involved in activities that exposed sensitive American-Iranian relations.
The guest uses these events to illustrate his broader argument that individuals within the Islamic Republic could become targets when their actions conflicted with the interests of more powerful networks.
XIII. The Difference Between American Presidents and Intelligence Institutions
Afshin introduces a distinction between earlier American administrations and the policies associated with Donald Trump.
He discusses the positions of presidents including Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and Joe Biden.
Afshin argues that, despite changes in administration, American policies often had the effect of preserving the Islamic Republic or allowing it to expand its regional influence.
He points to the Iran-Contra affair, the treatment of Iran during conflicts involving Iraq, diplomatic engagement, and the consequences of the 2003 invasion of Iraq.
In his interpretation, Donald Trump represents a departure from that earlier pattern.
Kourosh responds that a president may change without eliminating the organizational structures or personnel networks within intelligence institutions.
He argues that a president can issue instructions while remaining unaware of the identities of individuals carrying out operations abroad.
The guest distinguishes between elements of American intelligence that he believes served globalist interests and others that he believes operated in support of American national interests.
He suggests that shifts in American political leadership may alter how these longstanding networks are used.
XIV. The JD Vance–Mohsen Rezaei Connection
The interview discusses an alleged communication involving US Vice President JD Vance and Mohsen Rezaei.
Afshin raises the reported communication as a possible indication that Rezaei has become an important decision-making figure.
Kourosh interprets the alleged contact as consistent with his view that Rezaei remains an influential intermediary between American intelligence and Iranian power structures.
The guest argues that Rezaei’s continued presence is significant because of his experience, institutional relationships, and alleged history of carrying out sensitive assignments.
He suggests that other individuals may lack Rezaei’s connections or acceptance within the political and security establishment.
The alleged communication is discussed as part of the interviewees’ interpretation. Its precise contents, authenticity, and circumstances are not established within the supplied transcript.
XV. The Possibility of New Military Operations and Internal Purges
Kourosh extends his interpretation to current and future regional developments.
He suggests that Rezaei may be positioned to carry out additional instructions originating from American intelligence.
The interview mentions possible military actions involving Bahrain, Kuwait, and European countries as scenarios the guest associates with this alleged network.
He also discusses the removal of rival power centers within Iran.
Kourosh suggests that individuals associated with Russian or British interests may have been targeted or eliminated in struggles that could strengthen Rezaei’s position.
He refers to Ali Larijani and his family in this context and offers allegations concerning their background and political connections.
The guest describes the possibility of additional internal purges, changes in command, or a military coup.
These are presented as his interpretation and predictions about the direction of Iranian politics, not as established future events.
XVI. The Theory of an Iranian Abdel Fattah el-Sisi
One of the interview’s most important forward-looking arguments concerns the possibility of an Iranian figure resembling Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi.
Kourosh believes that Iran’s political transition may require an influential person already operating within the existing military or security establishment.
He argues that such an individual could help reorganize the country’s governing institutions and create the conditions for a broader political transition.
The guest identifies Mohsen Rezaei as one possible figure who could fulfill this role.
He does not describe this scenario as a simple transfer of power from the Islamic Republic to a new government.
Instead, he envisions a process in which someone from inside the system first brings the existing power structure under control.
He argues that such a process might make it possible for Reza Pahlavi to return to Iran under more stable conditions.
In this interpretation, an internal military figure would manage the initial transfer of authority, while Reza Pahlavi could later play a political role.
The guest emphasizes that the potential military figure and Reza Pahlavi would perform different functions.
XVII. Reza Pahlavi and the Opposition Movement
The discussion also addresses Iran’s opposition movements.
Kourosh questions the independence and credibility of several figures who have presented themselves as opponents of the Islamic Republic.
He alleges that some opposition personalities retain relationships with the political establishment or benefit financially from their opposition activities.
The interview references public figures associated with reformist, dissident, and exile political movements.
The guest argues that these competing personalities have prevented the emergence of a unified opposition capable of directing political change.
He identifies Reza Pahlavi as an important figure because of his international recognition and the political legitimacy the guest believes he possesses among supporters of the monarchy.
However, Kourosh maintains that a domestic power transition would likely need to occur before Reza Pahlavi could return and assume a meaningful political role.
XVIII. Military Intervention, Popular Protest, and the Risk of Continued Rule
The guest distinguishes between an internal military intervention that preserves the existing system and one that facilitates its replacement.
He argues that a coup could simply produce another version of the Islamic Republic under different leadership.
For this reason, he emphasizes the political objectives and eventual direction of any military intervention.
The interview refers to examples from other countries, including political movements associated with Egypt and Eastern Europe.
Kourosh argues that public demonstrations and internal security developments may need to coincide for a successful transition.
He discusses the possibility of elements within the Revolutionary Guards or the regular military participating in a change of government.
The guest presents the objective as a transition away from the Islamic Republic rather than the replacement of one senior official with another.
XIX. The Lion and Sun Movement and Iran’s Political Future
In the interview’s concluding portion, Kourosh discusses demonstrations associated with the Lion and Sun national movement.
He references protest slogans calling for the return of the Pahlavi dynasty and argues that these demonstrations demonstrate the continued existence of opposition to the Islamic Republic.
The guest believes that political change may occur through a combination of popular pressure, internal divisions, and military participation.
He raises the possibility that an internal intervention could reduce the loss of civilian life compared with an extended confrontation between armed security forces and demonstrators.
Kourosh suggests that figures currently serving within the Islamic Republic might eventually participate in dismantling the system.
He also discusses the possibility of legal proceedings against individuals accused of abuses after a change of government.
His concluding position is that individuals should be evaluated according to the roles they may play in a potential transition, rather than solely by their current affiliations.
Within this scenario, he presents Mohsen Rezaei as someone whose future actions may be politically significant.
XX. The Interview’s Central Proposition
Throughout the discussion, Kourosh advances a consistent argument: Mohsen Rezaei’s political career, institutional influence, and longevity should be examined through the possibility of longstanding intelligence relationships rather than through his public reputation alone.
The guest connects this proposition to the origins of the Islamic Republic, SAVAK, the Mansourun organization, the Revolutionary Guards, the Iran–Iraq War, the Iran-Contra affair, alleged intelligence meetings, internal political rivalries, and possible future changes in Iran’s leadership.
He portrays Rezaei as a figure who may have served multiple functions over several decades and whose political importance may not be fully apparent from his official titles.
The interview ultimately raises the possibility that a person associated with the existing Islamic Republic could play an important role in a transition away from that same system.
This is the central interpretation presented by the interview, not a conclusion independently established by Red Blood Journal.
Editorial Note — Red Blood Journal
This report documents the perspective presented in Day 40 Analysis — The Mystery of Mohsen Rezaei.
It reproduces the substance and direction of the interviewees’ arguments without independently endorsing, rejecting, or verifying their claims.
Allegations about intelligence affiliations, covert operations, political assassinations, foreign intervention, military decisions, and future political developments remain attributed to the individuals who expressed them.
Certain passages of the source transcript contain transcription errors or incomplete audio, and the report does not attempt to reconstruct missing details as facts.
Red Blood Journal presents this interview as an alternative point of view. The interpretation, evaluation of evidence, and final judgment are left entirely to the reader and audience.
🩸 Red Blood Journal
An interview report presenting a perspective, not declaring a verdict.
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The Mystery of Mohsen Rezaei
Nov 18, 2026
The provided text outlines a Red Blood Journal interview report examining the controversial career of Mohsen Rezaei and the unorthodox origins of Iran’s Islamic Republic. Guest Kourosh argues that the 1979 Iranian Revolution and subsequent military conflicts, such as the Iran–Iraq War, were heavily influenced by American intelligence and covert international networks. Furthermore, the discussion details Rezaei’s alleged ties to Western intelligence agencies, his rise within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and his purported involvement in high-level geopolitical scandals like the Iran-Contra affair. Finally, the sources explore speculative future political scenarios in Iran, suggesting that figures from the existing security apparatus might orchestrate a regime transition to eventually facilitate the return of Reza Pahlavi.


